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READING THE LEGAL PROCESS
Anthony J. Sebok*

THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW. By Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks.

Edited by William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey. New
York: Foundation Press. 1994. Pp. cxxxix, 1387. $49.95.
'

I. DEFINING THE LEGAL PROCESS
I saw my first copy of The Legal Process during law school when
a professor lent me his dogeared photocopy of Henry Hartl and
Albert Sacks's2 manuscript. Even though !knew that the manuscript had been copied freely for many years, and that hundreds,
maybe thousands, of versions sat in offices and libraries around the
world, I still experienced a slight thrill as I held a copy of the famous book that never became a book - as if I had in my hands a
samizdat or an artifact. Now that Foundation Press has "officially"
published The Legal Process thirty-six years after Hart and Sacks
last edited it, it is worth asking whether the act of publication
changes the meaning of The Legal Process in any way.
There is great irony in thinking of The Legal Process as a
samizdat. The Legal Process was never suppressed, and as William
N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey suggest in their elegant and
thoughtful introduction, the reasons for the failure to publish are
most likely prosaic.3 Furthermore, while samizdats may become influential through subversion, The Legal Process exercised its influ* Associate Professor, Brooklyn Law School. B.A. 1984, Cornell; M.Phil. 1986, Oxford;
J.D. 1991, Yale; Ph.D. 1993, Princeton. - Ed. I am grateful to the Seton Hall University
School of Law legal theory workshop for the opportunity to present some of the ideas contained in this essay. I would like to thank Jill Fisch, John Goldberg, Bill Reynolds, Ed Rubin,
and Spencer Weber Waller for their comments and suggestions. Thomas Uhl, Brooklyn Law
School Class of 1996, provided invaluable assistance in research and editing.
1. Late Dane·Professor of Law, Harvard University.
2. Late Dean and Dane Professor of Law, Harvard University.
3. Eskridge and Frickey suggest that Hart and Sacks never delivered a manuscript to
Foundation Press, despite a contract for publication signed in 1956, because of delays caused
by ill health, Hart's perfectionism, and then, after Hart's death in 1969, Sacks's decanal duties
at Harvard. An additional reason suggested by Eskridge and Frickey, and one that I believe
carries great significance, is that by 1958 the Warren Court had begun to push public law in a
direction that simply did not fit easily into the argument of The Legal Process. Pp. xcvii-xcix.
See also infra note 67.
·
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ence as a pillar, if not the pillar, of the established legal community
throughout the late 1950s and 1960s.4 The extraordinary influence
of The Legal Process in both practice and the academy probably
resulted from the fact that Hart and Sacks addressed themselves
directly to students, and not to a more self-selecting audience in the
law reviews. The Legal Process formed the foundation of a course
taught at Harvard for thirty years, as well as at many other law
schools that Hart and Sacks's friends, admirers, former colleagues,
and students populated (pp. ci-civ). It is important to realize that
Hart and Sacks could reach students who would not only become
the legal scholars of the future, but also partners in law firms,
elected and unelected members of government, and judges.s One
might even think that, unlike the authors of samizdats, who cannot
publish because of censorship and other threats, Hart and Sacks
never published The Legal Process because, given its success, they
did not really need to.
There is a bit more truth in comparing The Legal Process to an
artifact. Like a reconstructed object from an archaeological dig,
one might wonder what the 1958 edition of The Legal Process lacks,
and what additions would be necessary to complete it. Despite Eskridge and Frickey's careful explanation of the evolution of The
Legal Process - tracing its descent from Lloyd Garrison and Willard Hurst's materials for their course "Law and Society" in the late
1930s, to Hart, Abe Feller, and Walter Gellhom's materials for a
course on legislation in the early 1940s, to Hart's postwar materials
for his legislation course, to the four versions of the book produced
by Hart and Sacks between 1955 and 1958 - there is no way to
know how the book would have ultimately looked had it been allowed to continue to evolve. On the one hand, then, to ask whether
the book was ever finished is a trivial question; the authors themselves in word and deed declared it to be unfinished.6 They never
4. The Legal Process "provided the name, the agenda, and much of the analytical structure for a generation of legal thought-the 'legal process school.'" P. Iii. See Gu1Do CALA·
BRESI, A COMMON LAw FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 249 n.20 {1982); NEIL DUXBURY,
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, ch. 4 (1995); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANS.
FORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, 253-58 {1992); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL:
LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980s, 270-71 {1983); G. EDWARD
WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 144-63 (1978); Clark Byse, Fifty Years of
Legal Education, 71 IowA L. REv. 1063, 1076-77 (1986); Jan Vetter, Postwar Legal Scholarship on Judicial Decision Making, 33 J. LEGAL EDuc. 412, 415-17 {1983); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Metaprocedure, 98 YALE L.J. 945, 962 (1989) (book review); J.D. Hyman,
Constitutional Jurisprudence and the Teaching of Constitutional Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1271,
1286 n.70 (1976) {book review).
5. For example, as Eskridge and Frickey note, five members of the current Supreme
Court - Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer - had used The Legal Process at Harvard Law School. See p. cxxv.
6. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of The Legal Process, 107
HARV. L. REv. 2031, 2031 (1994).
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sent the book to its publisher, and they called it- and, presumably,
thought it important that others do so too - a "tentative edition."
In setting out to themselves their own map of the book, they repeatedly included in the table of contents chapters that had not yet
been written.7
On the other hand, as with other texts, other factors may overwhelm the intentions of the original authors, even on matters as
critical as content and closure. Thus, on a very nontrivial level The
Legal Process is a completed text. This is not because Foundation
Press put it between hard covers, but because over the past thirtysix years the 1958 tentative edition has acquired a canonical status
in the relevant interpretive communities. By the 1970s lawyers
were treating The Legal Process as not only an influential set of
teaching materials, but as the foundational text of the legal theory
known as "legal process." Regardless of whether Hart and Sacks
intended it to serve as an exposition and defense of a legal theory,
that is precisely how The Legal Process is now viewed, and, in a
very real sense, that is precisely what The Legal Process now is.
The Legal Process, in its artifactual form, now states Hart and
Sacks's legal theory, from which scholars have drawn three themes
in legal process.
The first theme emphasizes that legal process theory grapples
with institutional competence.8 This perspective stresses that Hart
and Sacks "believed that it was possible to distinguish legitimate
and illegitimate exercises of official power while simultaneously
transcending the centuries-old debate between ... the 'is' and the
'ought'."9 The Legal Process demonstrated that lawyers did not
have to engage in substantive moral or political reasoning, since
7. See p. lxxxix (Table 2).
8. See, e.g., MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960,
254 (1992); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960, 222 (1986); GARY
MlNDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMEN'I'S: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END
33-36 (1995); Barbara J. Flagg, Enduring Principle: On Race, Process, and Constitutional
Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 935, 943-44 {1994); James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in
Tort 61 CORNELL L. REv. 901 {1982); James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Norms in Products
Litigation: Liability for Allergic Reactions, 51 U. PITT. L. REv. 761, 767-69 (1990); Harold A.
McDougall, Social Movements, Law, and Implementation: A Clinical Dimension for the New
Legal Process, 15 CORNELL L. REV. 83, 90-91 (1989); Gary Peller, Criminal Law, Race, and
the Ideology of Bias: Transcending the Critical Tools ofthe Sixties, 67 TuL. L. REv. 2231, 2240
(1993); Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561 (1988) [hereinafter Peller, Neutral Principles]; Mark Tushnet & Timothy Lynch, The Project of the
Harvard Forewords: A Social and Intellectual Inquiry, 11 CoNST. COMMENT. 463, 479-80
{1994-95); Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 217 {1983); Vincent A. Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process
Tradition: The Legacy of Hart & Sacks, 29 ARIZ. L. REv. 413, 429-38 (1987); Akhil R. Amar,
Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 691-92 {1989) (book review); Joseph W. Singer, Legal
Realism Now, 16 CAL. L. REV. 465, 505-07 (1988) {book review).
9. Peller, Neutral Principles, supra note 8, at 569; see also Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of
American Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1151, 1183-85 (1985) [hereinafter Peller, Metaphysics].
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"there could be a kind of natural, functional correlation between
different kinds of disputes and different kinds of institutions, so that
the categories of dispute could be matched up with the kinds of
institutional procedures corresponding to them." 10 Thus, by adopting the value pluralism of pragmatists like John Dewey, legal process was able to argue - contra the realists - that the analysis of
legal validity is not reducible to political ideology.11
The second theme emphasizes the connection between legal
process and the problem of statutory interpretation.12 This perspective stresses Hart and Sacks's interest in proving that statutes
exemplified "reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably. "13 In a manner similar to the substance/procedure distinction implicit in the idea of institutional competence, Hart and
Sacks's theory of statutory interpretation rests on the conviction
that competing political interest groups could, if governed by the
right sort of procedure, produce rational public policy.14 This view
of statutes depended critically on the presumption that procedures
existed that could identify the purposes selected by the legislature
without actually substantively evaluating those purposes.is
10. Peller, Neutral Principles, supra note 8, at 594; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation As A Postmodern Cultural Form,
89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 719-20 (1991); Mark Kelman, Emerging Centrist Liberalism, 43 FLA. L.
REV. 417, 420-21 (1991).
11. See Peller, Neutral Principles at 583-84 (citing JoHN DEWEY, FREEDOM AND CULTURE (1939)); see also EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE Crus1s OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY:
SCIENTIFIC NATURAUSM & THE PROBLEM OF v ALUE 206 (1973); Minda, supra note 8, at 3435.
12. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 143-44
(1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in
the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 691, 694-700 (1987) [hereinafter Eskridge &
Frickey, Legislation Scholarship]; Eskridge & Peller, supra note 10, at 718-19; William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory
Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275, 281-83 (1988) [hereinafter Eskridge, Politics Without Romance]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1007, 1012-13 (1989) [hereinafter Eskridge, Public Values]; Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of
Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U.
PA. L. REV. 1567, 1571 (1988); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The
Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 249-50 (1992); Jane S.
Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation,
108 HARV. L. REv. 593, 600-01 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 405, 434-36 (1989); Wellman, supra note 8, at 450-51; Daniel B.
Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CAL. L. REV. 919, 941-42 (1989)
(book review).
13. P. 1378; see Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 942.
14. Eskridge and Frickey call this "optimistic pluralism." See Eskridge & Frickey, Legislation Scholarship, supra note 12, at 695-96; Eskridge, Public Values, supra note 12, at 1014.
15. See Eskridge & Peller, supra note 10, at 721-22. To the extent that Hart and Sacks
actually believed that such procedures existed, critics from the left exposed their view as
naive with the emergence of Critical Legal Studies, and the right with the emergence of
public choice scholarship. See, e.g., Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in
American Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 601, 666-67 (1993) [hereinafter Duxbury,
Faith in Reason]; Eskridge, Politics Without Romance, supra note 12, at 296-97; Peller, Meta-
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The third theme emphasizes the primacy of reason in legal process.16 This perspective stresses that legal process was "premised,
in every instance, on the belief that those who respect and exercise
the faculty of reason will be rewarded with the discovery of a priori
criteria that gives sense and legitimacy to their legal activities."17
Like many in their generation, Hart and Sacks believed that the
standard of rationality, independent from any given context or result, could be used to judge the "soundness" of a process.1 s Thus,
The Legal Process represents a significant episode in the postwar
liberal project associated with Robert Dahl and John Rawls.19
This essay endorses the idea that reading The Legal Process is a
reconstructive project in which one must treat the book as a finished whole. In that spirit, I will suggest that a fourth and somewhat different theme lies at the heart of the book. I will argue that
the structure of The Legal Process reveals an extraordinary concern
with the problem of adjudication and that the book adopts and defends Lon Fuller's conception of adjudication. My interpretation of
Hart and Sacks's argument is inconsistent, in varying degrees, with
the three themes identified above, and I hope my analysis will raise
some questions about our contemporary view of Hart and Sacks's
understanding of their own project.
II.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE LEGAL PROCESS AND ITS
LEGAL THEORY

A. The Two Faces of The Legal Process
1. The Subject of The Legal Process
The Legal Process operates on two levels: pedagogical and jurisprudential. Most immediately it seeks to serve as a casebook for
a course that had none. To serve this end, it adopts a casebook's
structure, with appellate decisions, commentary, and illustrative sephysics, supra note 9, at 1183-87; Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and
the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 192-94
(1986-87).
'
16. See RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 76-77 (1995); Duxbury, Faith in Reason,
supra note 15, at 602; WHITE, supra note 4, at 144; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. REv. 27, 34 (1994); Leslie Pickering
Francis, Law and Philosophy: From Skepticism to Value Theory, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 65, 75
(1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1733, 176970 (1995).
17. Duxbury, Faith in Reason, supra note 15, at 605.
18. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 352 (1973).
19. See, e.g., Duxbury, Faith in Reason, supra note 15, at 648-53 (discussing ROBERT A.
DAHL, A PREFACE To DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); John Rawls, Outline of a Decision
Procedure for Ethics, 60 PHIL. REv. 177 (1951)). As Duxbury notes, the identification of this
theme reconciles, to some degree, the seemingly contradictory claim that The Legal Process
presaged both John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust and Ronald Dworkin's Taking Rights
Seriously. Duxbury, Faith in Reason, supra note 15, at 695-701.

1576

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 94:1571

lections from law reviews and other secondary sources. The Legal
Process qua casebook possesses a slightly experimental format, in
that its seven chapters revolve around fifty-five problems. The
problems ask the student to take the role of a legal actor in a wide
range of roles - drafting a lease, giving advice to a legislator, or,
most often, deciding a case. Frequently Hart and Sacks follow a
problem with an extensive discussion of how real lawyers, legislators, or judges approach the problem, and then ask a series of openended questions about the conventional solutions to the problem.
The subject of The Legal Process is the subset of valid institutional decisions that involve the making or applying of law.20 Hart
and Sacks understand that a large share of society's institutional
decisions do not involve the creation or application of law; they
simply have little or nothing to say about nonlegal institutional decisions.21 According to Hart and Sacks, the difference between institutional decisions that focus, in some way, on law, and other
institutional decisions, is that institutional decisions about law are
"general, directive, and authoritative" (p. 114). So the decisions
taken by Citizen Smith to rent her house at price x and by Governor Jones to appoint a political ally to job y may be directive Smith and Jones speak "from one point of time to another" (p. 113)
- and may be authoritative - Smith and Jones claim that their
decisions "be entitled to observance and acceptance by all members
of the society" (p. 114) - but they are not general. Such "specific"
institutional decisions derive from law but they are not law: "Individualized arrangements of this kind are almost invariably derivative. They depend for their authority upon the fact that they have
been made in compliance with some much broader, underlying arrangement" (p. 114). Conversely, as long as an institutional decision is "general, directive, and authoritative," it must involve either

20. An institutional decision is a decision warranted by the "principle of institutional settlement." P. 4. The principle of institutional settlement "expresses the judgment that decisions which are the duly arrived at result of duly established procedures of this kind ought to
be accepted as binding upon the whole society unless and until they are duly changed." P. 4.
Although it reflects a very particular view of political theory, Hart and Sacks provide a scant
few pages of argument for the principle of institutional settlement and then assume that its
validity is obvious to the reader. The principle of institutional settlement clearly springs from
Hobbes: "The alternative to disintegrating resort to violence is the establishment of regularized and peaceable methods of decision." P. 4. In Hart's notes to his "Legislation" course,
which Eskridge and Frickey characterize as the foundation of the materials for the course
"The Legal Process" (pp. lxxxv-lxxxvii), Hart's debt to Hobbes becomes even more pronounced: " 'When questions arise which in some way or other have to be settled, people find
a means for settling them. The alternative to war is peace; the alternative to force is law.' "
P. lxxxiv. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 223 (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1968).
21. In the first substantive section of The Legal Process, Hart and Sacks spend the first
five pages explaining the justification of the principle of institutional settlement without mentioning "law" or "the courts" except as a subcategory of the social order. See p. 4.

May 1996]

The Legal Process

1577

the creation or application of law, whether issued by a court, an
administrator, or even a private citizen.22
The Legal Process, therefore, studies "general, directive, and authoritative" decisionmaking at "all levels": "private, judicial, legislative, administrative, and constitutional."23 Hart and Sacks offer a
visual metaphor - "The Great Pyram~d of Legal Order" - to describe an orderly, almost geometric, relationship among these different techniques of legal decisionmaking.24 Thus, the technique
that appropriately determines the legal relationship between private citizens - such as a contract - will be different from the technique appropriate to determining the legal relationship at issue in
an arbitration, an administrative procedure, or an appellate court
argument. A recurrent theme in The Legal Process is the idea that
a good lawyer should develop the judgment needed to pick the
technique appropriate for the type of problem at hand. The book,
thus, frequently asks the student to weigh the comparative advan22. This noteworthy definition of law transcends certain traditions that were familiar to
readers in the 1950's. For example, the idea that a law must be directive, authoritative, and
general leaves out any requirement that a law serve the sovereign. Hart and Sacks carefully
define "authoritative" as "claiming to be entitled to observance and acceptance by all members of society," and because their definition does not rely on the identification of a sovereign, it represents a break with Austinian legal positivism. P. 114 (emphasis added). See
JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 220-22 (spec. ed. 1984)
(1832); see also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 89-91 (2d ed. 1994); Anthony J. Sebok,
Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2054, 2108-09 (1995) (noting similarity between H.L.A. Hart and Sacks and Hart). Also, their definition of law does not equate law to
predictions of what "courts do in fact." See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457, 461 (1897). It thus represents a break with proto-realism and realism. See Holmes,
supra; JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). Finally, their definition does
not require that law conform to moral truth. It thus represents a break with the Neo-Scholastic tradition of natural law. See, e.g., Francis E. Lucey, Natural Law and American Legal
Realism: Their Respective Contribution to a Theory of Law in a Democratic Society, 30 GEo.
L.J. 493 (1942). In fact, what is refreshing about Hart and Sacks's definition of law is that it is
not court-centered. Their definition suggests that any member of society can make or apply
law as long as they conform to the three criteria identified with the practice of "general
directive arrangements."
23. P. 107; see also p. 112 ("The further examination of the nature of the process of institutional decision, and of the problems involved in making and appraising the decisions in
each of the major types of institutional processes, is the concern of these materials from this
beginning to the end.").
24. See pp. 286-87. The base of the pyramid consists of "billions upon billions of events
and non-events" in which members of society make laws through private orderings, apply
those laws by complying with contracts, leases, etc., and apply the public laws made by the
state by complying with the criminal laws, the ta,x laws, etc. At the next level are those
"situations in which established general arrangements are claimed to have been violated" but
no action is taken by the unhappy party. The third level represents those cases in which the
parties to a dispute settle their legal disagreement privately, through "agreement and formal
release; arbitration; and the decision by private associations." The fourth level captures
those cases that are "instituted in courts or other tribunals endowed with powers of formal
adjudication" but that are settled. The fifth level concerns those cases that are ultimately
never contested in court but are disposed of through a final judgment, such as a "default or
•.. consent judgment," or a dismissal or plea of guilty. The sixth level consists of litigated
cases in courts. Finally, the seventh level "includes all the cases which go to some reviewing
tribunal."
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tages of legal decisionmaking through private agreement, majority
voting, administrative dictate, arbitration, or adjudication.ZS
2.

The Argument of The Legal Process

A quick look at the table of contents suggests that Hart and
Sacks designed the book as a pedagogical exercise in legal methods.
After the introductory chapter sets out Hart and Sacks's definition
of law, the book proceeds in an orderly fashion through the typical
lawmaking and law-applying categories familiar to the social scientist: private agreements (Chapter Two), the common law courts
(Chapter Three), referendums and the electoral system (Chapter
Four), the legislative process (Chapter Five), the executive branch
and its administrative agencies (Chapter Six), and the interpretation of statutes by the courts (Chapter Seven).2 6 Although the vast
majority of the problems scattered throughout the seven chapters
involve judicial decisionmaking, one cannot conclude that The
Legal Process only grapples with institutional decisions made by
courts. If this were so, then Hart and Sacks would have called it
The Judicial Process. 27 It is one of their great achievements that
they were able to take Benjamin Cardozo's insights about adjudication and apply them to law outside the courtroom. Thus, while all
of the fifty-five problems in The Legal Process concern institutional
decisions that involve either the creation or application of law, not
all involve institutional decisions made by courts.
If The Legal Process did no more than define and taxonomize
the varieties of legal activity in society, it would still be significant
as an early example of the influence of the Law and Society movement on mainstream legal education.28 Hidden behind Hart and
25. This list illustrates, but does not exhaust, what Hart and Sacks mean when they refer
to the "choice among several [institutional] procedures" that society must make in order to
take advantage of the principle of institutional settlement. P. 112.
26. Eskridge and Frickey note that the original design of The Legal Process called for
nine chapters. Chapter 8 would have covered "The Making and Amending of Constitutions"
which was originally chapter 2 in the 1955 draft, and chapter 9 would have engaged "Private
Remedies for Unlawful Official Action." Neither was written. See p. Ixxxix. In some respects, Dean Harry Wellington offered a glimpse of what chapter 8 might have looked like in
Common Law Rules. and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83
YALE LJ. 221 {1973).
27. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF TIIE JUDICIAL PROCESS 13 (1921)
(introducing "the study of judge-made law").
28. As a survey course in the making and application of law by various public and private
actors, "The Legal Process" would have closely resembled LLOYD K. GARRISON & WILLARD
HURST, LAW IN SOCIETY: A CoURSE DESIGNED FOR UNDERGRADUATES AND BEOINNINO
LAW STUDENTS (rev. ed. 1940) (3 volumes}, materials designed for the course taught by Garrison and Hurst at the University of Wisconsin. As Eskridge and Frickey note, Garrison and
Hurst's "entire project was one of institutional structure, procedure, relationship, and, most
of all, institutional competence (a term the authors did not use)." P. lxxii. For more about
Hurst and the "Law and Society" movement, see Aviam Soifer, Willard Hurst, Consensus
History, and The Growth of American Law, 20 REvraws IN AM. HIST. 124 {1992).
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Sacks's broad view of the relationship of law and society, however,
is a subtle twist that makes it much more normative than it would
first appear. At first glance, the organization of the table of contents suggests that Hart and Sacks intended to use the book's :fiftyfive problems to illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of various techniques of lawmaking and law-applying, leaving it to the student to decide, for example, whether a labor dispute is best settled
by a private agreement, arbitration, or adjudication. But Hart and
Sacks dispense with any pretense of neutrality in their discussion of
the solution to the problem, and through their pointed questions
they convey to the student exactly what they think of the likely consequences of each choice.29 Similarly, Hart and Sacks make no effort to hide their opinions towards their theory of lawmaking and
law-applying at any point in the book. Although Hart and Sacks
are explicitly not court-centered, their book is implicitly but aggressively "adjudication-centered."30 In other words, the progression
from the "judicial" to the "legal" process comes with a catch. They
argue throughout The Legal Process that although legal decisionmakers do not have to be judges, they should adopt the forms
of adjudication in their decisionmaking processes. As I hope to
demonstrate below, Hart and Sacks build this argument into the
very fabric of their textbook, so that at strategic points in the book's
structure, in selection of cases and commentary, they direct the student towards the advantages of their preferred theory and highlight
the weaknesses of its rivals.
B.

The Valorization of Common Law Adjudication
1. Fuller's Theory of Adjudication
It is important to stop for a moment to consider more carefully
what Hart and Sacks mean by "adjudication." They note that most,
but not all, of the application of law occurs in courts, and that for
this reason lawyers focus on adjudication (p. 178). The first section
of the chapter on common law provides some important clues about
Hart and Sacks's views on adjudication. In Problem No. 10,31 Hart
and Sacks teach the student about the deceptively simple distinc29. See pp. 275-77. In another example, after presenting Roscoe Pound's argument at
some length, Hart and Sacks ask tartly, "Does Dean Pound's analysis hold water?" P. 89.
Hart and Sacks often use such open-ended questions rhetorically throughout the book,
although perhaps none so sarcastic as the following: "What do you think the [plaintiff railroad workers] thought of the intelligence of Judge Sanborn and Judge Lochren? Is this a
healthy attitude for people in a free society to have toward their courts?" P. 1142 (discussing
Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 117 F. 462 (8th Cir. 1902)).
30. "Advancing a theory of adjudication is a central aim of The Legal Process." Wellman, supra note 8, at 417.
31. See p. 345 (Problem No. 10: Law, Fact, and Discretion in the Application of Law)
(reviewing Holmes's decisions in Commonwealth v. Wright, 137 Mass. 250 (1884), and Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 15 N.E. 491 (Mass. 1888)).
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tion between questions of law and questions of fact in trial. They
clearly reject the view, which they attribute to Jerome Frank, that
one cannot distinguish between issues of fact and law.32 Furthermore, they seem to believe that judges, who find and apply the law,
should minimize the discretion of juries, who find the facts.33 One
might imagine that Hart and Sacks advocate the reduction of the
jury's role because laypeople simply are not as competent at judgment-making as the educated, elite judiciary. But subsequent comments by Hart and Sacks suggest that they would also disapprove of
a judge acting like a jury.. For example, in a case in which a judge
sits without a jury, they consider it an abdication of the judicial role
for the judge "to state only his naked conclusion: [for example]
that 'the defendant is guilty of driving an automobile so as unreasonably to endanger life.' "34 Hart and Sacks think that the judicial
role demands more, for unless the judge provides reasons for the
conclusion he reaches:
[t]he parties will have no idea of the basis of his decision; and the
losing party, being left in the dark, may be harder to convince that the
decision is just. And an appellate court will have trouble in reviewing
the decision to decide whether or not it involves error, unless it retraces the whole process of decision de novo. Compare the difficulty
of reviewing an arbitrator's award or an administrative order which is
unexplained by any articulate findings or reasons. Perhaps even more
important, other private persons will have no aid in planning future
conduct. [p. 357]

This statement leads into a section entitled "The Reason-ForBeing of Judicially Declared Law," which uses two problems and
finally Lon Fuller's The Forms and Limits of Adjudication to set out
the essential features of adjudication.35 Although the Fuller article
32. See p. 344 (citing Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303
{1947)); JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949); see also p. 349.
33. Problem No. 10 concerns jury instructions in which the defendant was accused of
promoting a lottery. The defendant admitted that he had promoted the game described by
the prosecution, but denied that what he had done was a lottery. Hart and Sacks ask the
student to pick between the following jury instructions:
(a) A request by defendant's counsel for an instruction that if the jury believed beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant had set up and promoted a lottery for money,
they should find him guilty; otherwise, not guilty;
(b) A request by the prosecuting attorney for an instruction that if the jury believed
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had conducted a game having the following described characteristics (specifically enumerating all of the characteristics of the
game which the defendant had admittedly conducted) then they should find him guilty;
otherwise not guilty.
P. 345. Hart and Sacks express their dislike of (a) pretty clearly at p. 353.
34. P. 356. Note that this option resembles jury instruction (a) discussed supra note 33.
35. The first problem is based on Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Me. R.R., 1 Gray 263
(1854). Duncan Kennedy has called Chief Judge Shaw's decision in that case to limit the
extent of a railroad's duty as a common carrier a classic expression of the rationality of common law adjudication. See Kennedy, supra note 18, at 361. Shaw's decision - which "dissolved" the "sharp opposition of legislature and judicial functions" - was successful because

May 1996]

The Legal Process

1581

appears as just another selection for the student to read, Fuller is
not merely just another author whose views Hart and Sacks thought
they should present in the text for the student to consider.36 They
cite to Fuller so frequently, and use his terminology so naturally,
that there is good reason to believe that Hart and Sacks self-consciously adopted his view of adjudication.37 Fuller began his argument by noting, like Hart and Sacks, that laws must rest "upon
some rule, principle, or standard,"38 and, like Hart and Sacks, he
connected the rationality of law to its being "purposive."39 Fuller,
however, was far more systematic in organizing a conceptual picture of adjudication.4 o Fuller tried to identify the conditions under
which adjudication might occur in its ideal form, so that he could
then determine at what point legal process ceased to be adjudicative and became either a "Mixed, Parasitic, [or] Perverted Form[]
of Adjudication."41 He thought that for a decisionmaking process
to be adjudicative in the ideal sense, it had to possess the following
features: (1) the process must be adversarial- "[t]he arguments of
counsel hold the case, as it were, in suspension between two opposhe confonned to the special fonn or "rationality" of adjudication. See id. Although used
primarily to demonstrate the desirability of common law courts to make law, it also serves as
an example of adjudication that was successful, more or less, because the decisionmaker gave
the reasons for his decision.
The next problem, "The Need for the Reasoned Elaboration of Precedent: The Case of
the Faithless Fiduciary," was chosen, I suspect, because it rests on a decision that lacks the
imagination and creativity of Norway Plains. See p. 397 (reviewing Berenson v. Nirenstein,
326 Mass. 285 (1950)). In addition to demonstrating how common law courts make law by
choosing between competing lines of precedent, this problem also provides an example of a
court that failed to give adequate reasons for hs adjudicative act.
36. As Eskridge and Frickey note, Hart and Sacks reproduce an excerpt from "[a]n unpublished paper presented by Professor Lon L. Fuller to a group of Harvard University
faculty members on November 19, 1957." P. 397, n.* (citing the 1958 version of The Legal
Process) [hereinafter Fuller, Manuscript]. This paper - much like The Legal Process itself
- was famous and often cited during Fuller's lifetime, but remained unpublished for many
years. See ROBERT S. SUMMERS, LoN L. FULLER 10 (1984). A later, substantially revised
version of the essay was published posthumously. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits
of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353 (1978) [hereinafter Fuller, Forms].
37. See Duxbury, Faith in Reason, supra note 15, at 633. The picture of adjudication
attributed to Fuller in the following pages of this review bears a strong resemblance to the
five features of adjudication that Abram Chayes attributed to the "received tradition" civil
litigation in the 1950s and '60s. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282-83 (1976).
38. P. 398 (quoting Fuller, Manuscript, supra note 36). In their introductory section on
"general directive arrangements," Hart and Sacks organize laws according to the degree they
possessed the features of either a rule or a standard, and promote either a principle or a
policy. See pp. 113, 138-43.
39. Seep. 400 (quoting Fuller, Manuscript, supra note 36). Hart and Sacks attempt to
establish, at the very beginning of chapter 1, that "law is concerned essentially with the pursuit of purposes." Pp. 108-09.
40. For an excellent analysis of Fuller's picture of adjudication, see SUMMERS, supra note
36, at 90-100.
·
·
41. Fuller, Forms, supra note 36, at 381.
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ing interpretations of it"42; (2) "the adjudicative process should normally not be initiated by the tribunal itself"43; (3) the tribunal
should aspire to base its decisions, as much as possible, on the
proofs and arguments presented by the parties44; ( 4) the tribunal
must be impartial45; (5) the tribunal's decision must be retroactive
- it may have prospective effects, but it must also have a retroactive effect46; and (6) the tribunal "must . . . at some appropriate
point ... give reasons for the result reached."47
Hart and Sacks recognize that given the complexity of the definition of adjudication they adopt, adjudication is appropriate for
only a fraction of institutional decisions. They follow Fuller by declaring that adjudication most effectively resolves conflicts that result from human organization by common ends or shared purpose,
42. Id. at 383; see also SUMMERS, supra note 36, at 91. Hart and Sacks say something
similar at 633. See also id. at 643 ("Adjudication implies ... [a] tribunal imposing a solution
upon the parties to a dispute in the respects in which they have failed to agree..•. The
process is not one of mediation ... ").
43. Fuller, Forms, supra note 36, at 385.
44. Id. at 388·91. Fuller well understood that this condition was more often breached
than honored, but he was emphatic about pointing to its breach as one of the early warning
signs of a procedure crossing the invisible line between a mixed form of adjudication and a
perverted form. See id. at 388 ("We need to remind ourselves that if .•. the grounds for the
decision fall completely outside the framework of the argument, making all that was discussed or proved at the hearing irrelevant - then the adjudicative process has become a
sham .... "). Summers identifies another reason as well: "As [Fuller] saw it, 'the essence' of
(adjudication] is to give each side a chance to know what the other is saying and to afford
each an opportunity to refute the other." SUMMERS, supra note 36, at 92.
45. See Fuller, Forms, supra note 36, at 391. Hart and Sacks say something similar and
add a criterion: "[A]djudication implies that the deciding officers are not politically accountable to anyone for any particular decision. They [are] subject ..• only to their own consciences." P. 642.
46. "It is not the function of courts to create new aims for society or to impose on society
new basic directives." Fuller, Forms, supra note 36, at 392; see also SUMMERS, supra note 36,
at 92. Hart and Sacks seem to be less hostile to prospective decisionmaking than Fuller. See
pp. 600-15; but see pp. 630-40 (Problem No. 23. Advisory Opinions: The Case of Mr. Jefferson's Incompleted Forward Pass).
47. SUMMERS, supra note 36, at 92. This is one of Fuller's most difficult claims to interpret, and while I tend to agree with Summers' statement, Fuller's final version of Forms is
slightly weaker than the position attributed to Fuller by Summers. See Fuller, Forms, supra
note 36, at 387. On the other hand, Fuller also says that "it seems clear that the fairness and
effectiveness of adjudication are promoted by reasoned opinions [in which the tribunal states
its reasons]." Id. at 388.
What Fuller ultimately believed is not so important because Hart and Sacks appear to
agree with the position Summers attributes to Fuller. They say that "it is an integral part of
the concept of adjudication as exemplified in the conventional forms of the judicial process
that decision is to be arrived at by reference to impersonal criteria of decision applicable in
the same fashion in any similar case." P. 643 (emphasis added). If "by reference" means that
the tribunal must publicly state its reasons, then Hart and Sacks adopt an even stronger
position than Fuller on the connection between the giving of reasons and the having of reasons in adjudication. It is interesting that in the version of Forms that Hart and Sacks quote
in The Legal Process, Fuller seems to assume that the tribunal will state to the losing party
the reason for its decision. Seep. 644. See also White, supra note 4, at 144-45; Sebok, supra
note 22, at 2102 (on Hart and the need for the Supreme Court to explain its reasons).
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as opposed to organization by reciprocity.4 8 Problems of reciprocity, unlike problems of shared ends, have no rational solution and
therefore should not be solved by adjudication but through other
forms of institutional decisionmaking, such as negotiation (private
lawmaking) or voting (legislation).49 There is something almost
perverse about Hart and Sacks embracing Fuller's form of adjudication and then refusing to apply it to the vast majority of conflicts
that arise from private orderings - after all, contract and tort disputes are matters of private law. Fuller anticipated and addressed
this problem. He argued that although creating and enforcing the
rules of the market is a shared purpose and therefore an appropriate subject of adjudication, the outcome of the market is not a
shared purpose and therefore an inappropriate subject of adjudication.so For similar reasons, Hart and Sacks follow Fuller in concluding that if a problem involves the application of many rules and
principles then it is "polycentric" and "require[s] handling by the
method either of ad hoc discretion [managerial dictate] or of negotiation or of legislation."51
48. See pp. 646-47. Fuller offered the following illustrations:
Order (or organization) through common ends can be illustrated by the following situation: A common road gives access to two neighboring farms. A boulder rolls across this
road, blocking it .... Joining together [the two farmers] are able to remove the obstruction. Here an association of two men makes both of them richer.
. . • Organization by reciprocity, on the other hand, requires that the participants
differ in their "values," that is, that they evaluate differently the same objects .... By a
trade of [the objects], both farmers can become richer.
P. 402 (quoting Fuller, Manuscript, supra note 36). It is important to note that Fuller accepted that problems stemming from non-converging values - "organization by reciprocity"
- are technically susceptible to regulation by either the market or political control.
49. See p. 645; see also Fuller, Forms, supra note 36, at 363-64.
SO. "A market is a regime of reciprocity; it presupposes and requires a divergence of
individual objectives. Establishing the rules necessary for the functioning of such a mechanism is a meaningful task for adjudication; performing the tasks of the mechanism itself is
not." P. 402 (quoting Fuller, Manuscript, supra note 36). It is for this reason that Hart and
Sacks conclude that "[q]uestions arising within the regime of reciprocity with respect to what
constitutes a satisfactory exchange are not ordinarily appropriate for adjudication." P. 646.
This distinction between the rationality of social rules and rationality of their outcomes is
based, in part, on Hart and Sacks's adoption of the Fullerian idea of the "fallacy of the static
pie." Pp. 102-03. Hart and Sacks seem to be assuming, contrary to Rawls, that although
institutional arrangements concerning the market have a rational structure, the distribution
of goods in a society governed by a rational institutional structure is not, in itself, subject to
rational analysis. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusnCE 83-90 (1971); Duxbury, Faith in
Reason, supra note 15, at 653; see also Fuller, Forms, supra note 36, at 404 ("The court gets
into difficulty, not when it lays down rules about contracting, but when it attempts to write
contracts.").
51. P. 647; see also p. 647 ("Adjudication of disputes about managerial decisions involving the selection of a course of action for the future from among many possible courses is not
ordinarily satisfactory, if it is feasible at all, because of the numerous variables to be taken
into account ..•."). Fuller, supra note 36, at 394-404; Chayes, supra note 37, at 1289-92 (on
the "[d]emise of the [b]ipolar [s]tructure" in modem litigation); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV.
L. REv. 410, 424-25 (1978) (arguing that Fuller's polycentric model is partially a result of the
parties to the dispute not being evaluated by the same criteria).
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Fuller did not argue in "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication"
that adjudication bests other institutional decisionmaking procedures from the perspective of either morality or philosophy.s2 In
fact, as Hart and Sacks suggest, Fuller understood that adjudication
can sometimes be less effective than other techniques at settling disputes.s3 Fuller did suggest, however, that because adjudication concerns itself solely with rationally resolvable disputes, it is "the
tendency of the adjudicative process to induce voluntary acceptance
of its results."s4 Hart and Sacks's chapter on the common law, like
Fuller's essay, explicitly defines adjudication and then determines
whether it should be chosen over some other method.ss Hart and
Sacks agree with Fuller that knowing the limits of adjudication is as
important as knowing its form.s6
2.

The Lure of False Adjudication

At the end of Chapter Three Hart and Sacks attempt to identify
the "kinds of disputes which lend themselves to reasoned decision"
(p. 646). They include disputes in which the "claimant asserts a
right to a remedy within the power of the tribunal to grant," and
disputes in which the available remedy does not require too much
discretion on the part of the adjudicator (p. 646). Hart and Sacks
exclude, for example, an antitrust dispute that would require a
judge to "reorganiz[e] the ... industry," "questions arising with the
regime of reciprocity with respect to what constitutes a satisfactory
exchange," and "disputes about managerial decisions involving the
selection of a course of action for the future from among many possible courses" (pp. 646-47). In general, the resulting list shows an
extraordinary ,bias towards disputes that arise in corhmon law.s1
52. Fuller made these arguments in LoN L. FULLER, THE MORALITY oF LAW (2d ed.
1969).
53. See p. 645. "To the extent that the resolution of the dispute depends essentially upon
what Professor Fuller calls the principle of order by reciprocity, as distinguished from the
principle of order through common ends (including the maintenance of a regime of reciprocity), the method of adjudication operates to eliminate the best judges of a satisfactory exchange'""'." namely, the parties to the exchange themselves ...." P. 645 (emphasis added).
54. P. 400 (quoting Fuller, Manuscript, supra note 36).
55. Hart and Sacks reject the idea that "there are no disputes of any kind which cannot
be effectually settled by establishing an impartial and sufficiently prestigeful tribunal to hear
them, giving both sides or all sides of the dispute an opportunity to present their evidence
and argument, and then having the tribunal make its decision." P. 644.
56. This is true for two reasons. First, "[w]here adjudication is used to settle disputes not
subject to rational decision, the moral force of the institution suffers." P. 401 (quoting Fuller,
Manuscript, supra note 36) (emphasis added). Second, "if a dispute is not susceptible to a
reasoned solution, then the attempt to force it into the mold of adjudication will render
unavailable the very means which are rationally best calculated in most situations to produce
a satisfactory settlement." P. 645.
57. See also Duxbury, Faith in Reason, supra note 15, at 661 ("Hart and Sacks purport to
favor neither common law nor legislation, yet they seem to display a peculiar preference for
the judicial decision.") (footnote excluded).
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Hart and Sacks argue that there is a connection between the form
of adjudication and common law. Because the "remedies available
in the armory of the common law courts [are] few and relatively
well defined," an adjudicator "will always be able to determine
whether a claimant does or does not possess a right" (pp. 646-47).
As long as law stays within the boundaries fixed by adjudication, it
will be provided with "a comprehensive, underlying body of law
adequate for the resolution of all the disputes that may arise within
the social order."58 But the valorization of common law in Chapter
Three is not simply an act of exclusion; rather it suggests that, to the
extent that other legal techniques are susceptible to rational analysis, they ought to adopt the form of adjudication.
Fuller recognized the concept of adjudication as an ideal type,
and that it could manifest itself in the world in greater and lesser
degrees. It was with this skeptical attitude that he turned to newer
"mixed" forms of adjudication such as arbitration or administrative
law. Fuller noted that "tripartite" arbitration, which during the
1940s and 1950s became a widely used decisionmaking procedure in
. the emerging field of labor law,59 "tends to deteriorate ... into a
kind of continuation of bargaining behind closed doors, or ... into
an empty form." 6° Fuller was equally skeptical about the capacity
of administrative agencies to operate effectively while adhering to
the adjudicative mode of decisionmaking.61 Fuller_thought that, at
58. P. 647. Hart and Sacks's description of the "completeness of the common Jaw" is
shared by both Christopher Langdell and Ronald Dworkin. See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's
Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 7 (1983). It is worth noting that the example Fuller uses to
demonstrate his theory of the inherent rationality of the common law is the problem of what
rule to apply "when the acceptance and revocation of an offer cross in the mails." P. 401
(quoting Fuller, Manuscript, supra note 36). Fuller notes that although honest minds might
disagree over the proper solution, the choice between the modem rule - acceptance is effective upon dispatch - and its alternative is not "purely arbitrary" but "may be derived rationally from the purposes shared by a commercial community." P. 401 (quoting Fuller,
Manuscript, supra note 36). It is unclear whether Fuller, like Langdell, invokes "higher
level" legal principles, or solves this legal problem by invoking policy. See C.C. LANGDELL,
A SUMMARY OF TiiE LAW OF CoNTRACTS 20-21 (2d ed. 1880); Grey, supra, at 27; James
Boyle, Legal Realism and the Social Contract: Fuller's Public Jurisprudence of Form, Private
Jurisprudence of Substance, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 371, 372-73 (1993) (on the tension between
Fuller's instrumentalist tendencies in his contracts scholarship and the formalism that pervades his jurisprudential writings).
59. Seep. 330 (citing Edgar L. Warren & Irving Bernstein, A Profile of Labor Arbitration,
4 IND. & LAB. REL. 200, 217 (1951)).
60. Fuller, Forms, supra note 36, at 397. Hart and Sacks equally criticize arbitration in
nonlabor cases. At the end of Problem No. 8 ("Private Arbitration: The Case of the Litigious Investor") they examine with skepticism the argument$ in favor of voluntary arbitration.
See, e.g., pp. 314-21 (questioning the alleged advantages stemming from private arbitration's
speed, lack of rancor, technical expertise, privacy, freedom from precedent, and finality).
61. Fuller suggested that polycentric problems were often given to administrative agencies because "[t]he instinct for giving the affected citizen his 'day in court' pulls powerfully
toward casting exercises of governmental power in the mold of adjudication, however inappropriate that mold may tum out to be." Fuller, Forms, supra note 36, at 400. He argued
that certain administrative agencies, such as the War Manpower Commission, the Office of
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a certain point, a law-like process that tries to solve a problem "not
susceptible of a reasoned solution"62 became a perverse form of adjudication that survives only by drawing its "moral strength" from
institutions of real adjudication.63
Hart and Sacks conclude Chapter Three by focusing on the
problem of parasitic adjudication. They refer to the "many wellintentioned bandits [who] engage in attempted raids upon [adjudication's] prestige ... they want the benefits of judge-made law without having to accept the conditions of decision which are necessary
to secure the benefits."64 As this language suggests, Hart and Sacks
see a double threat from public decisionmaking that falsely helps
itself to the prestige and authority of true adjudication. They argue
that not only can parasitic forms of adjudication deny disputants a
process better suited to solve their problem (p. 645), but notwithstanding the success of any individual episode of parasitic adjudication, the practice has a corrosive effect on the overall legal system. 6s
In order to help the student identify parasitic adjudication, Hart
and Sacks even offer an exercise in which they ask the student to
decide whether adjudication could successfully solve any one of the
fictional disputes they set out in a list. The list constitutes a spectrum that ranges from a mere award of a license to an international
crisis.66 Hart and Sacks stress that the question is not whether these
disputes should be solved in court, but instead whether they should
be solved by any of the "tribunals which clothe their proceedings in
Price Administration, and the War Production Board, could perform their functions effectively and precisely because they did not attempt to "act adjudicatively," while the FCC, for
instance, suffered from its attempt to provide an adjudicative procedure in the awarding of
television and radio licenses, a task that Fuller thought was ultimately not susceptible to
reasoned solution. See id. at 400-03.
62. The phrase is Hart and Sacks's. See p. 645.
63. Fuller, Forms, supra note 36, at 406.
64. P. 642 (discussing whether an institutional procedure for obtaining advisory opinions
would qualify as adjudication).
65.
If society is to achieve any degree of effective order, we must leave it to the highest
political power to make those decisions that can claim no greater rationality than that
they respond to a felt need for some decision, right or wrong...• [But) the judge must
find some better justification for his decision than that they decide.
P. 644 (quoting Fuller, Manuscript, supra note 36). In the final version of Forms, Fuller takes
a slightly less hostile view of parasitic forms of adjudication: "In labeling [a form of decisionmaking] 'parasitic,' I intend no more condemnation than when a botanist calls a certain fungus 'parasitic.' Just as, from the standpoint of human interest, there are good and bad fungi,
so parasitic forms of order may be good or bad.'' Fuller, Forms, supra note 36, at 406.
66. The examples are: choosing a recipient of a broadcast license among a set of applicants, the solution of a labor dispute, the final formulation of a zoning plan, the resolution of
a regulations dispute between the United States Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board, the resolution of a deadlock between the two Houses of Congress over the
amending of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, and a dispute between two countries over the alleged attempts by one country to change the form of government in the other
country. See p. 641.
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some or all of the conventional trappings of adjudication" (p. 641).
The distinct impression one has at the end of Chapter Three is that
Hart and Sacks believe that none of the disputes in that list should
be solved through adjudication, and that for that reason, they are
hostile to an activist use of law for progressive ends.67 That view is
partially right; however, I think it is more accurate to say that Hart
and Sacks were less concerned ·about restricting the subject matter
and political direction of the legal process than they were about
insuring that important social problems were not mishandled either
by being forced into an adjudicative process when they were not
susceptible to rational analysis, or by being subjected to a legal process that was insufficiently adjudicative.6s
C.

The Covert Argument for Adjudication in The Legal Process

The Legal Process purports to survey all the techniques contained in the "Great Pyramid of Legal Order," but the book's own
structure undermines that claim. To be sure, Hart and Sacks do not
make the mistake of assuming that only judges can adjudicate, and
one of the wonderful features of the book is that they explore ways
in which legal actors other than judges can bring the values of adjudication into their legal activity. Even so, it is interesting to look at
where Hart and Sacks ultimately dedicate the book's energies.
They spend 42 % of the book on just two topics: the enforcement of
the common law by judges (Chapter Three) and the interpretation
of statutes by judges (Chapter Seven). No other chapter except for
the chapter on the creation of legislation (Chapter Five) receives
similar attention.69
Obviously, one should conclude only so much from the length of
chapters. Yet, even this crude measure suggests that Hart and
Sacks seem more interested in the work of judges than in work of
other actors in the legal system. In fact, a careful review of the
content of the seven chapters - especially the chapters on the com67. It is hard not to imagine that Hart and Sacks are addressing the specter of Brown v.
Board of Education when they state that "[t]he present question is whether the enthusiasts
for adjudication as a method of settling every kind of social problem may not be opei;i to the
charge of trying to make a similarly parasitic use of the prestige of the method." P. 642. See
Norman Dorsen, In Memoriam: Albert M. Sacks, 105 HARV. L. REv. l, 12 (1991) (contesting
the criticism made by progressive lawyers that legal process wallowed in "conservative and
procedural fetishism"); see also p. cxix; Vetter, supra note 4 at 417.
68. Of course, it is very possible that Hart and Sacks's deep commitment to maintaining
the "prestige" and "integrity" of the legal process by testing its range against the ideal of
adjudication is inextricably linked to a politically conservative agenda. This essay will not
take up that question. Compare Peller, Neutral Principles, supra note 8, at 608 (arguing the
connection was inevitable) with Duxbury, Faith in Reason, supra note 15, at 667 (the connection is "exaggerated").
69. For example chapter 4 (on referendums and the election of lawmakers) is only 42
pages long and chapter 6 (on the executive branch and administrative agencies) is 100 pages
long.
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mon law, legislation, and statutory interpretation - reveals that
Hart and Sacks do not examine judges so much as the work of
judges. That is, Hart and Sacks have a deep commitment to the
idea of adjudication, an activity that, as noted above, occurs most
frequently but not exclusively in the courtroom. Hart and Sacks
criticize judges who, in their opinion, evade or pervert adjudication,
and they cautiously support nonjudicial actors who, where appropriate, faithfully adopt the forms of adjudication.
For example, Hart and Sacks spend an extraordinary amount of
space criticizing Justice Black's "abdication" of judicial responsibility in Problem No. 18.70 In Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling &
Refitting Corp, 71 a worker, covered by the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Worker's Compensation Act (LHWA), sued and received
judgment against Halcyon, the owner of the ship upon which the
worker was injured. In the same action, the jury returned a special
verdict finding Halcyon 25% responsible and the worker's employer, Haenn, 75% responsible for the injury. Halcyon then sued
Haenn for contribution. The Court heard arguments on whether
admiralty allows contribution as between joint tortfeasors on account of claims by third persons, and if it does, whether the LHWA
limited Haenn's contribution to the compensation owed the worker
under the federal statute. Justice Black, writing for the Court, held
that "it would be unwise to fashion new judicial rules of contribution and that the solution of this problem should await congressional action." 72 Hart and Sacks mercilessly critique the Court's
argument that admiralty law had not yet developed either precedent or principle upon which to extend the doctrine of contribution
from collision cases to noncollision cases.73 They argue that Halcyon was not driven by its doctrinal reasoning - which Hart and
70. See p. 496. The problem is titled "The Paradox of Making Law by Refusing to Make
Law: The Halcyon Case."
71. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
72. P. 498 (quoting Halcyon, 342 U.S. at 285). The Court reserved the question of
whether, if Congress chose to extend the right to contribution among joint tortfeasors to
admiralty cases, the contribution should be limited by the LHWA. Seep. 499 n.12.
73. They conclude that:
At one stroke the Court (1) reached an unsound conclusion in the case before it, (2)
destroyed the harmony of the underlying maritime law in this general area, and (3) established a precedent which puts into question the continued vitality in the federal courts

of the whole Anglo-American tradition of growth of decisional law.
P. 515 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, Hart and Sacks argue that by denying the common law right to contribution, the Court turned tortfeasors like Halcyon into absolute indernnitors of joint tortfeasor
employers, because the LHWA, a form of workman's compensation, naturally allowed the
employer to recover its payments from the employee if the employee successfully sued a
third party like Halcyon. See pp. 508-09. It is worth noting that Hart and Sacks unfavorably
compare Black's refusal to use the Court's earlier collision cases to solve this noncollision
case with Shaw's application of case law to common carriers to the railroads in Norway
Plains. See p. 501.
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Sacks call "so much eyewash" (p. 516) - but by Justice Black's
misunderstanding of the Court's role. Black's opinion tried to determine whether Halcyon had a right to contribution by asking
whether in this matter "the method of legislative growth of the law
is to be preferred to the method of judicial growth." In so concluding, Black pretended that, by deferring to Congress, the Court in
fact was not making law.74 Hart and Sacks suggest that a lack of
respect for adjudicative values animated Black's "profoundly anticonstitutional and indeed unconstitutional" reasoning (p. 517).
Black supported his decision by asserting that Congress had entered the sphere of maritime personal ,injury, which demonstrated
that:
many groups of persons with varying interests are vitally concerned
with the proper functioning and administration of [maritime torts] ...
[w]e think that legislative consideration and action can best bring
about a fair accommodation of the diverse but related interests of
these groups.75

On the other hand, noted Black, in the case before the Court the
only party "in favor" of allowing contribution was Halcyon.76 Hart
and Sacks accuse Black of trivializing the interests of the parties
and considering "the wishes" of economic interest groups not even
before the Court.77 In fact, Hart and Sacks accuse Black of stripping away from the case many of the elements that they deem central to adjudication: by ignoring the parties in interest, the Court
did not stand "suspended" between two advocates; the Court made
and interpreted law but gave no reasons; and finally, instead of limiting itself to the remedies available to it, the Court enthusiastically
embraced a polycentric task.78 This, according to Hart and Sacks,
74. Seep. 517; see also p. 515 {"There can be no doubt, can there, that the Court actually
'fashioned new judicial rules' while asserting that it was 'unwise' and 'inappropriate' to do
so •.. ?").
75. P. 498 (quoting Halcyon, 342 U.S. at 286).
76. P. 498 (quoting Halcyon, 342 U.S. at 286).
77. Seep. 517 ("[C]ould unconcern for the interests of the parties before the Court be
made more explicit?"). One might think that Halcyon anticipated the modem trend towards
expanding the set of parties of interest in public law litigation. See Chayes, supra note 37, at
1291; Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667, 1723-47 {1975). However, Hart and Sacks's criticism of Black's decision went beyond
accusing him of misunderstanding adjudication. They suggest, ultimately, that Black's decision sought to insure that the worker's employer in Halcyon would have an incentive to
advance the worker money while he sued the employer's co-tortfeasor. Thus, Halcyon - its
language about deference to Congress notwithstanding - was really about securing a "tactical advantage ... which will predispose a negligent employer to finance the employee in the
employee's own lawsuit so as to pass the whole buck of the loss in a polite way to the employer's co-tortfeasor." P. 521. Hart and Sacks opine that this result would have appealed to
Black because it would make it easier for workers to sue negligent third parties like Halcyon.
This appeal proves in the minds of Hart and Sacks the truly unprincipled and realist roots of
the decision. See p. 521.
78. Despite the fact that the result of the Court's process was to defer to a legislative
body, the question that Black asked - who should decide whether there is a right to contri-
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was not a case of a nonjudicial body adopting a perverted form of
adjudication but of a court adopting a perverted form of legislation.
Although they do not say so explicitly, Hart and Sacks most approve of agencies when they incorporate adjudicative values. For
example, in Problem No. 43, aptly named "Drafting an Administrative Opinion: The Oil Pump Fiasco," they compare an actual Federal Trade Commission decision with an alternative model decision
written for their book.79 Whereas the Commission issued a decision that consisted of nothing but :findings of fact, a conclusion, and
an order, Hart and Sacks's model decision looks like a judicial opinion, with sections entitled, "analysis of issues," "findings of adjudicative fact," and "conclusions of law" (pp. 1084-92). Hart and
Sacks make no attempt to hide their preference for their model decision.80 Hart and Sacks believe that the only reasonable interpretation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act is that it
required the FTC to "build up a body of administrative law through
the articulation of grounds of decision intelligible enough and well
enough reasoned to have an impact at the stage of primary private
activity" (p. 1103). In other words, the Commission, like a court,
was responsible "in the determination[s] of matters of law" (p.
1107), and, like a court, the more its procedures reflected adjudicative values, the better it would do its job.s1 Hart and Sacks's assumption about the centrality of adjudication in the legal process of
bution in this case - was not "susceptible of reasoned elaboration and ... ought to be made
by a political arm of the government," and had been already answered by Congress. P. 516.
Hart and Sacks therefore understood Black's act of judicial passivism with regard to statutes
as an act of judicial activism with regard to the Constitution. See, e.g., Peller, Neutral Principles, supra note 8, at 600 (stating that Hart and Sacks were "staunchly opposed" to judicial
activism only at the level of constitutional law).
79. See p. 1083. The decision upon which Hart and Sacks base this example, Matter of
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, Docket No. 337, 2 F.T.C 357 (1920), involved Standard Oil's
practice of leasing gasoline pumps at below cost to retail gasoline dealers on the condition
that the pumps be used only to pump Standard Oil's gasoline. The Commission found that
the leasing arrangement violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 and
Section 3 of the Clayton Act of 1914. The Commission's findings were later invalidated in
Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey), 261 U.S. 463 (1923).
80. The only secondary source they include, GERARD HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL
TRADE CoMMISSION (1924), clearly inspired their model decision:
It seems to me that the most important single step which the Commission could take ...
would be to abandon the formal and legalistic "findings" to which it is now addicted, and
to adopt instead ... signed opinions of the kind employed ... in the courts of England
and of the United States.
P. 1105 (quoting HENDERSON, supra, at 334).
81. Hart and Sacks say that the FTC's standard practice failed to satisfy a number of the
conditions for adjudication: (1) the process was not truly adversarial, since the decisionmaker did not technically choose between two competing legal arguments; (2) the tribunal did not, in its decision, base its decision on the proofs and arguments presented by the
parties; (3) the decision written by the tribunal did not deal impartially with the arguments
presented by both sides. See p. 1106 (quoting HENDERSON, supra note 80, at 334-37).
Neither Henderson nor Hart and Sacks discuss how an administrative agency could satisfy
the adjudicative ideal that the decisionmaker be impartial.
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agencies is evident also in their theoretical discussion of the interpretation of statutes by agencies in Chapter Seven. Hart and Sacks
approve of Justice Robert Jackson's view that when Congress writes
a law like the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, which forbade "unfair methods of competition,'' the relevant agency must, in
interpreting the "inchoate" law, make law. 82 But in doing so, the
agency finds itself in the same position as a court interpreting an
"avowedly indeterminate direction[ ]."83 Since Hart and Sacks minimize the difference between the judicial interpretation of a statute
and legislation,84 it should not be surprising that they see little difference between adjudication by a court and by an agency: "an
agency can formulate law in the same form and manner as a
court."85
So far, we have seen that Hart and Sacks privilege courtroom
adjudication and hypothesize that greater allegiance to adjudication
could improve the work of administrative agencies. A final piece of
evidence of The Legal Process's commitment to the primacy of adjudication is Hart and Sacks's treatment of legislation in Chapter
Five. When they find statutory interpretation wanting - and they
often do - it is because it lacks one or more of the essential qualities found in adjudication. For example, Hart and Sacks spend an
unusual amount of space discussing the origins of the American
Law Institute and codification movements in general - a peculiar
decision given that Chapter Five purports to discuss legislation.
The lesson they draw from the history of the Restatements is that
the ALI incorrectly thought that it could usefully organize the common law into a set of rules, not principles, based on authority rather
than reason (pp. 740-41). The Restatement project took a turn for
the better in 1953 when the ALI "approved[] a substantial change
in policy ... [and allowed] an 'enlarged statement of reasons' .in the
comments" and other steps designed to show "that 'the law does
grow by court decisions.' "86 This early section in the chapter in82. Pp. 1309-10 (quoting Federal Trade Commission v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952)
(Jackson, J., dissenting)).
83. P. 150 ("[The] broad standard [established by the Federal Trade Commission Act of
1914] was backed up and informed by principles and policies implicit in the history and general scheme of the statute.").
84. See, e.g., p. 126 ("Enacted law may displace decisional law as a means of initial formulation of legal arrangements, but not as a means of elaboration[, f]or enactments need to be
interpreted ....").
85. Pp. 1311-12. Hart and Sacks argue for the distinctiveness between agencies and juries, and end up showing that judges and agencies share many adjudicative features: (1) both
are "capable of formulating legal standards and rules" to guide future conduct - i.e., explain
the reasoning; (2) both must be as "even-handed .•. as possible"; and (3) both must formulate the governing rules and standards in the case before them - i.e., restrict themselves to
the arguments of the parties before them. Pp. 1311-12.
86. Pp. 746-47 (quoting A.L.I. Proceedings from 1953 & 1954). Hart and Sacks are similarly skeptical about European code systems. They argue, in effect, that in order to avoid
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tends to make clear, from the beginning, that the real mistake made
by those who distinguish common law and legislation is not that
they focus on the fact that the former is announced by judges and
the latter created by politicians, but that they think that the former
resides in principles and that the latter in a set of rules. 87 Hart and
Sacks challenge this idea, as evidenced by the following rhetorical
questions: "Cannot there also be postulates of reasoning, which
limit and control, behind the words of statutory provisions.... Cannot a legislature effectually state its postulates and tell the courts
that they are to treat them as lifting and controlling in their reasoning?"88 The rest of the chapter seeks to show that statutes should
reflect, as much as possible, the sort of principles found in common
law.
In Problem No. 29 ("Revision of Judicial Interpretation of an
Existing Statute"), Hart and Sacks use a lengthy excerpt from a
congressional hearing to illustrate the dangers of encouraging the
idea that a statute is all rule and no principle. The purpose of the
hearing was to pass a relatively simple piece of legislation to reverse
a Supreme Court decision that had held that the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act did not require a manufacturer to permit
entry by a federal inspector.89 In Cardiff, the Court refused to give
the Act what clearly was its only reasonable reading, because according to Hart and Sacks - the Court felt that since Congress
had created a "mess" by writing a vague or self-defeating rule, Congress should see its purposes frustrated and then amend the law
through subsequent legislation.9° Hart and Sacks clearly think that
had the Court treated the Act like a principle, it could have renoverly rigid and outdated codes, French and German lawyers, when necessary, reason from
their codes in the same way that an English or American lawyer reasons from principles in
the common law. See pp. 764-66 (discussing the "Recourse to Generality" in the French Civil
Code); see also pp. 771-72 (quoting JUSTUS w. HEDEMANN, DIE FLUCHI' IN DIE GENERALKLAUSELN (1933)).
f!:/. Hart and Sacks clearly disagree with the sentiment that "a code must be dogmatic ..•
a statute must never be either a reasoning or a dissertation." P. 781 (quoting ERNST FREUND,
LEGISLATIVE REGULATION (1932)).
88. P. 783. Hart and Sacks illustrate their point with an example based on Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902), in which they propose three
alternative hypothetical acts of legislation that would enforce the common law right to privacy that the New York Court of Appeals had denied erroneously, in Hart and Sacks's opinion, as well as those of other courts and the New York legislature. The alternative they
prefer "avoids the difficulties .•. [of] fragmentary codification by a level of generality that
leaves all of [the difficulties in elaborating the principle] to be resolved by future judicial
action." P. 783. See also Kennedy, supra note 18, at 396; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword:
The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 79 n.395 (1992).
89. See pp. 810-33 (discussing United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952)).
90. See pp. 817-18. Hart and Sacks mockingly refer to this response to poorly framed
legislation as the "fiagellant theory of statutory interpretation." P. 91. It is quite similar to
the position taken by Fuller's mythical Justice Keen. See Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the
Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REv. 616, 636-37 (1949).
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dered it coherent through adjudication and they use the example of
the hearing to show the unintended and unfortunate consequences
of the Court's approach. In the relatively insignificant episode they
document, an industry lobbyist tried to get a congressional committee to state in the legislative records that the clarification of the
FDA's right to entry, which confirmed a previous FDA construction, should not be seen by the courts as a confirmation of other
previous administration constructions of the same act (pp. 814-15).
As Hart and Sacks observe, the congressmen. had backed themselves into a comer. By allowing the courts to treat its statute like a
. limited rule, Congress had no alternative but to tell the courts that
their approval of a subsequent reasonable interpretation of its act
by the FDA did not indicate an approval of other FDA interpretations of the same statute based on the same reasoning.91 This case,
like others in the chapter, is used by Hart and Sacks to illustrate the
perils of viewing legislative intent as no more than a statute's author's specific intentions.92 The only cure to this problem, Hart and
Sacks seem to say, is for courts to treat legislation like common
law.93
91. From the questions Hart and Sacks ask the student, it is clear that, given the premises
upon which the statute had been drafted, the committee had failed to meet the objections
raised by the lobbyist at the hearings. See p. 833.
92. The first rule of statutory interpretation Hart and Sacks offer at the end of chapter 7
says, "a court ... is to decide what meaning ought to be given to the directions of the statute
in the respects relevant to the case before it. [This] does not say that the court's function is to
ascertain the intention of the legislature with respect to the matter at issue." P. 1374. Hart
and Sacks fill chapter 5 with examples of statutes that fail to serve the public interest because
they sought to address specific, often private, needs, rather than .to create "general directive
arrangements." For example, Problem No. 35 ("Provision of Government Services and Pecuniary Inducements: The Uses of Insurance, Especially Against Floods") and Problem No. 36
("A Special Law Dealing With a Municipal Disaster") are textbook examples of what would
later be understood as "rent-seeking" legislation. See Eskridge, Politics Without Romance,
supra note 12, at 288; see also JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS
OF CONSENT 233-48 (1962) (on rent-seeking in public choice). Eskridge and Frickey suggest
that Hart and Sacks may not have realized the pessimistic implications of their picture of
legislative failure. See pp. cxxi-cxxii; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Legislation Scholarship and Ped(lgogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 691,
705-07 (1987) (Richard Posner's "legisprudence" corrected Hart and Sacks's naive views of
legislation).
93. Hart and Sacks implicitly criticize the apparent distinction between the adjudication
of common law and statutes in chapter 1 when they discuss their general principle of law the reasoned elaboration of general directive arrangements - without distinguishing between statutes and common law. See pp. 147-48. Their sense th.at statutory interpretation
should mainly focus on the search for principle explains, for example, their rejection of the
"literal approach," and their skepticism of the utility of legislative history. See pp. 1116-48,
1212-54. Hart and Sacks clearly reflect the influence of Edward Levi in this view. Levi was
as skeptical about the apparent distinction between statutory interpretation and common law
interpretation as Hart and Sacks. See, e.g., EDWARD H .. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
REASONING 29-30 (1949). Levi, however, urged a theory of statutory interpretation that was
more deferential to early judicial interpretations of legislative intent than the view adopted
by The Legal Process. Compare LEVI, supra, at 31-32 (in trying to construct legislative intent,
a court has "more discretion than it has with case law," and for that reason must be more
deferential to precedent) with p. 1343 (commenting on Levi's theory).
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CONCLUSION

The idea that The Legal Process is an argument for the superiority of Fuller's conception of adjudication helps to explain the decline of legal process during the 1960s and 1970s.94 Paradoxically,
Hart and Sacks's willingness to locate legal decisionmaking beyond
the courtroom was accompanied by an extraordinarily demanding
set of criteria for the form of legal decisionmaking. By allowing
that not all legal actors had to be judges, but then criticizing their
results when they did not act like judges, Hart and Sacks really took
away with one hand what they gave with the other. It is likely that
Hart and Sacks thought that by defining adjudication according to
Fuller's rigorous criteria they were increasing the stature of
America's newer nonjudicial adjudicators, and yet what they may
have done unwittingly was exactly the opposite. By narrowing the
range of problems that both courts and nonjudicial actors such as
agencies could solve through adjudication, they may actually have
provided the premise upon which critics from the left and the right
built the argument that American public law was unprincipled.
As I suggested in Section One, our task as readers of The Legal
Process is to help complete Hart and Sacks's unfinished text. I offer
a reading that takes seriously the idea that their materials reflect a
coherent jurisprudential theory. My reading insists on treating The
Legal Process as a coherent text and uses its structure to indicate
the content of Hart and Sacks's argument.
My structural reading of The Legal Process suggests certain consequences. First, my reading is not entirely compatible with the
three traditional approaches to legal process described in Section
One. The particular conception of adjudication that I locate at the
core of the book is not primarily motivated by a theory of institutional competence, since it reflects a method available to a variety
of social actors. Furthermore, Hart and Sacks's conception of adjudication is not primarily a theory of statutory interpretation, since it
is as much (if not more) a theory of common law interpretation.
Finally, although Hart and Sacks see rationality as a component of
their conception of adjudication, rationality underdetermines adjudication, since Hart and Sacks demand that adjudication take place
within certain artificial and highly specific conditions. 95
94. As Eskridge and Frickey note, during the very same period that the legal process
generation "w[as] exercising power" in society, The Legal Process was losing influence in the
academy. Pp. cxviii. See also Duxbury, Faith in Reason, supra note 15, at 669 (noting the
tendency for academic critics to dismiss The Legal Process as "an anachronism").
95. Hart and Sacks's conception of adjudication may bear the same relationship to rationality that classical common law's concept of "artificial reason" bore to natural reason. See
GERALD POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND TiiE COMMON LAW TRADmON 30-31 (1986).
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Second, it is important to ask some hard questions about the
degree to which Hart and Sacks were wedded to Fuller's theory of
law. While it is clear that they embraced Fuller's conception of adjudication, it is not obvious that the theory of law developed in
Chapter One of The Legal Process can be reconciled with major
elements of Fuller's legal philosophy. Tue "principle of institutional settlement," which states that a decision is "in some sense
'right' simply because it has been duly made" (p. 109), seems to
have more in common with legal positivism than Fuller's own version of natural law.96 This raises the possibility that, even as a completed work of theory, The Legal Process fails the test of coherence.
Third, I cannot ignore the fact that any structural reading of The
Legal Process can be no more than an act of virtual reconstruction,
since not all the pieces that are missing from this artifact ever existed. We will never know what the two unwritten chapters of The
Legal Process would have said, what cases they would have discussed, and how they would have affected the structural reading
that produced the specific conception of adjudication proposed in
this essay.97 These problems cannot be wished away, and they are
the inevitable consequence of engaging Hart and Sacks on their
own terms, as the architects of a theory of adjudication that they
believed could both explain and shape the institution of law in modem America.
-

96. See, e.g., Eskridge, Public Values, supra note 12, at 1014-15 (describing legal process
as positivist); Sebok, supra note 22, at 2105 (same). Fuller's natural law theory was modest
and carefully designed to avoid the mistakes of other more extreme views. See SUMMERS,
supra note 36, at 61. Nonetheless, Fuller seemed to believe in a coincidence between rationality and morality that suggests a thicker theory of process than Hart and Sacks's: "[the
positivist] seems to assume that evil aims may have as much coherence and inner logic as
good ones. I, for one, refuse to accept that assumption." Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity
to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 636 (1958). I explore the
relationship between Fuller and legal process in ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL PoslTIVISM AND
nm GRowra OF AMERICAN JurusPRUDENCE (forthcoming Cambridge Univ. Press 1996).
97. A further, and less optimistic question raised by the missing chapters is whether the
chapter on constitutional law (what was to have been chapter 8) was never written because it
could not be written. That is, did Hart and Sacks find that their conception of adjudication,
which seemed to provide satisfactory explanations of the making and interpretation of common law and statutes, simply could not make sense of the polycentric, prospective, and inherently political problems of constitutional law? See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 37, at 1290.

